Readiness

37. Readiness of force elements (for example, an Army brigade, Royal Navy ship, or Royal Air Force aircraft and crew) is used as the measure of military capability. Continuing the package of work begun in 2000/01, quantitative and qualitative measures of force element readiness were brought together for the first time in 2001/02. This enabled capability strengths and weaknesses to be identified and addressed more easily. Further work was also initiated to tackle the potential difficulties associated with undertaking a series of operations concurrently. As a result of these developments, the accuracy and coherence of military capability assessments increased significantly. 

38. Despite the high level of operational activity, the overall ability of force elements to meet specified readiness targets improved marginally over the year (see Table 2). Although weaknesses persisted in those areas described below, the initiatives set in place to rectify these deficiencies began to take effect. 

Table 2: Percentage of Rapidly Available Force Elements at Required Readiness State [1]
	2000/01	2001/02

Royal Navy and Marines	95%	93%
Army	72%	81%
Royal Air Force	90%	90%

Notes: [1] Percentage of those force elements intended to be rapidly available (i.e. those held at very high, high or medium readiness) that were at medium readiness or above.

39. The naval operational programme was achieved despite a number of significant shortfalls in the readiness of some Royal Navy and Royal Marine force elements. Although
this was largely due to a shortage of trained personnel, the impact on the front line was mitigated by the use of full time reservists. The Royal Navy was also affected by a number of equipment defects, particularly in the submarine fleet, and by a shortage of some helicopter spares. 

40. The Army successfully fulfilled all operational tasks in 2001/02. Despite continuing pressures resulting from specific sustainability challenges and continued under-manning, readiness levels improved compared to the previous year. 

41. The Royal Air Force continued to experience difficulties in maintaining the required levels of overall force element readiness. This was largely due to continuing manpower shortages in certain key areas of employment, along with some equipment shortfalls. These difficulties did not affect forces assigned to very high and high readiness status and accordingly, the Royal Air Force was able to meet fully all of its operational commitments. 

42. The strength of the Armed Forces, on 31 March 2002, is detailed at Annex E. 

Joint Rapid Reaction Forces

43. During 2001/02, elements of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces operated successfully in Macedonia and Afghanistan. These operations were among the first to benefit from improved force projection capabilities, following the entry into service of four C-17 strategic lift aircraft. These aircraft were progressively delivered from 23 May 2001, and the fleet formally entered service on 30 September 2001, three months ahead of schedule. Charter arrangements ensured that three roll-on roll-off container ships were also available at short notice in 2001/02. 

44. Considerable progress has been made towards the delivery of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. However, manpower shortfalls and the effect of the high operational tempo, continued to place significant pressure on the Public Service Agreement target of achieving operational capability by March 2003. These areas of shortfall continue to be addressed. 

Joint Force Logistic Component

45. The utility of the Joint Force Logistic Component was demonstrated, both in support of operations in Afghanistan and on Exercises SAIF SAREEA II and JOINT VENTURE. The two Logistic Brigade Headquarters that have provided the basis of this Joint Force to date are not established for this task and, as such, the Component does not have a standing Headquarters or any dedicated force elements. Work was therefore instigated to improve its overall capability, particularly in the areas of readiness, deployability, and command and control. Strategic and theatre communications for the Component will continue to be provided from centrally controlled assets to maximise use of resources. 

Exercises and Military Training

46. The main focus for all three Services in 2001/02 was Exercise SAIF SAREEA II, undertaken in Oman between September and October 2001. This was the largest UK military exercise since the 1980s, and involved around 22,500 Armed Forces personnel, together with 49 aircraft, 44 helicopters, over 4,500 vehicles (of which 547 were armoured), and a Naval task force of 21 ships, all with integrated logistic support. A further 12,800 personnel from the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces took part. 

47. This was the first time since the Gulf War that the UK had deployed a medium-scale joint task force over such a long distance, and the logistics, communications and engineering challenges were particularly significant. The large number of concurrent real-world commitments, including the start of operations in Afghanistan, exacerbated these demands. Nevertheless, the exercise provided invaluable training from unit level up to the joint task force, and identified many important lessons that will enhance the development and effectiveness of the UK's Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (see paragraphs 43-44). 

48. The Royal Navy also undertook a number of other major exercises in 2001/02. These included: ARGONAUT 01, the pre- and post-SAIF SAREEA II exercise period for the Amphibious Ready Group; ORACLE force integration training; Exercise SEA DAGGER, an amphibious exercise with the United Arab Emirates; and Exercise BLUE GAME, a NATO littoral warfare exercise in Scandinavian waters. However, the Naval Service's role in post-11 September operations had an unavoidable impact on the exercise programme. The Royal Marines' winter deployment training was significantly reduced, as was Royal Navy participation in the NATO quadrennial exercise, STRONG RESOLVE. This was mitigated by the valuable experience gained from conducting actual operations. 

49. The Army's annual exercise programme balances the requirement to train units to the appropriate standard against the need to provide stability for its personnel. In 2001/02, a succession of demanding combined arms exercises were conducted to ensure that both regular and Territorial Army units met their mandated levels of readiness. Of particular note were exercises: HARDFALL, a NATO warfighting exercise in Norway; MEDICINE MAN, a series of field training exercises in Canada; and IRON ANVIL, a formation level field training exercise to deliver the Army's high readiness mechanised formations for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. Restrictions on activity due to the foot and mouth disease outbreak led to the cancellation of two major exercises planned for May 2001 (DRUIDS DANCE and MEDICINE MAN 1). A number of other smaller exercises in the UK and abroad were either curtailed, cancelled or reduced in scale. 

50. Royal Air Force aircraft took part in an extensive exercise programme in North America, including RED and MAPLE FLAGs, and a major US Air Force exercise in Alaska (COPE THUNDER). Following Exercise SAIF SAREEA II, the Jaguar Force successfully participated in Exercise MAGIC CARPET alongside the Sultan of Oman's Air Force. Contributions to the Defence Diplomacy Mission included: Exercise BRIGHT STAR, a US/Egyptian-led exercise that featured the first major overseas deployment of the UK's Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Regiment; and Exercise INITIAL LINK in Bahrain. Adjustments to the planned programme included the cancellation of Exercise SNOW GOOSE, a Jaguar Force winter training exercise in Norway, due to reprioritisation. Participation in Exercise STRONG RESOLVE was curtailed with the withdrawal of Tornado F3 and supporting air-to-air refuelling assets for operational reasons. 

51. A comprehensive list of military exercises undertaken by all three Services in 2001/02 is available on the MOD website at http://www.mod.uk.