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Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - The Assessment of the British
Government
PART
1
IRAQ'S
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES
CHAPTER
1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
- Since UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there
has been little overt information on Iraq's chemical, biological,
nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Much of the publicly
available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions
is dated. But we also have available a range of secret intelligence
about these programmes and Saddam Hussein's intentions. This
comes principally from the United Kingdom's intelligence and
analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security
Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have
access to intelligence from close allies.
- Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities
which are designed to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam's
regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services.
Intelligence, however, has provided important insights into
Iraqi programmes and Iraqi military thinking. Taken together
with what is already known from other sources, this intelligence
builds our understanding of Iraq's capabilities and adds significantly
to the analysis already in the public domain. But intelligence
sources need to be protected, and this limits the detail that
can be made available.
- Iraq's capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to the
Prime Minister and his senior colleagues on the developing assessment,
drawing on all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes
some of the most significant views reached by the JIC between
1999 and 2002.
Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC)
The JIC is a Cabinet Committee with a history dating back
to 1936. The JIC brings together the Heads of the three Intelligence
and Security Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government
Communications Headquarters and the Security Service), the
Chief of Defence Intelligence, senior policy makers from the
Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office,
the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry and
representatives from other Government Departments and Agencies
as appropriate. The JIC provides regular intelligence assessments
to the Prime Minister, other Ministers and senior officials
on a wide range of foreign policy and international security
issues. It meets each week in the Cabinet Office. |
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