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Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - The Assessment of the British
Government
CHAPTER
2
IRAQ'S
PROGRAMMES: 19711998
- Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare
research for over 30 years. Its chemical
warfare research started in 1971 at a small, well
guarded site at Rashad to the north east of Baghdad. Research
was conducted there on a number of chemical agents including
mustard gas, CS and tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation
called al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham was established. In the late
1970s plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale
Effects
of Chemical Weapons
Mustard is a liquid agent, which gives off a
hazardous vapour, causing burns and blisters to exposed
skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract;
when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea. It attacks
and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and
blood-forming organs.
Tabun, sarin
and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the
most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing
muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes
of VX on the skin can cause rapid death. |
production facility in the desert some 70km north west of Baghdad
under the cover of Project 922. This was to become Muthanna State
Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the
front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production.
It became operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development
sections, each tasked to pursue different programmes. In addition,
the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production facility,
and it also took the lead in weaponising chemical and biological
agents including all aspects of weapon development and testing,
in association with the military. According to information, subsequently
supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991
was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have
been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage
and precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and
3 near Habbaniyah, north west of Baghdad, parts of which were
not completed before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf
War.
- Iraq started biological
warfare research in the mid-1970s. After small-scale
research, a purpose-built research and development facility
was authorised at
al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak. This is surrounded on
three sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km south
of Baghdad. Although some progress was made in biological
weapons research at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate
on developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at
al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the
early 1980s, the biological weapons programme was revived.
The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small
biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna,
The effects
of biological agents
Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium
Bacillus Anthracis. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation
of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare.
The symptoms may vary, but can include fever and internal
bleeding. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days,
with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.
Botulinum toxin
is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first
symptoms of poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post
exposure or as late as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation
period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death
by suffocation.
Aflatoxins
are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms
take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by
aflatoxins can cause liver inflammation and cancer. They
can also affect pregnant women, leading to stillborn babies
and children born with mutations.
Ricin
is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ
failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.
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helped to develop the programme. At about the same time plans
were made to develop the Salman Pak site into a secure biological
warfare research facility. Dr Taha continued to work with her
team at al-Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak, which
was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence.
Significant resources were provided for the programme, including
the construction of a dedicated production facility (Project 324)
at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation
testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in association
with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990,
other civilian facilities were taken over and some adapted for
use in the production and research and development of biological
agents. These included:
-
al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute
which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research.
There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also conducted
on anthrax;
-
al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water
Research Centre where Iraq admitted it undertook aflatoxin
production and genetic engineering;
-
Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Institute
which was used for the storage of biological agent seed stocks
and was involved in genetic engineering.
-
By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was
producing very large quantities of
chemical and biological agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations
to the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced
at least
-
19,000 litres of botulinum toxin,
8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,200 litres of aflatoxin and
were working on a number of other agents;
-
2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes
of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes
of VX.
-
Iraq's nuclear
programme was established under the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation
agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear
research centre, equipped with a research reactor, was built
at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre. The research
reactor worked up to 1991. The surge in Iraqi oil revenues
in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research
programme. This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by the acquisition
of two research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium
fuel and equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the
end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of
the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June
1981 shortly before it was to become operational; the other
was never completed.
-
By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq's position in
the war with Iran prompted renewed interest in the military
use of nuclear technology. Additional resources were put into
developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile material
(material that makes up the core of a nuclear weapon) for
use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred because
it could be more easily produced covertly than the alternative,
plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programmes to produce highly
enriched uranium (HEU), electromagnetic isotope separation
(EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment
facility was nearing completion and another was under construction.
However, Iraq never succeeded in its EMIS technology and the
programme had been dropped by 1991. Iraq decided to concentrate
on gas centrifuges as the means for producing the necessary
fissile material. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction,
but the centrifuge design was still being developed. In August
1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single
nuclear weapon within a year. This programme envisaged the
rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade
to produce weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research
reactor, which was already substantially enriched, and unused
fuel from the reactor bombed by the Israelis. By the time
of the Gulf War, the crash programme had made little progress.
-
Iraq's declared aim was to produce a missile warhead
with a 20-kiloton yield and weapons designs were produced
for the simplest implosion weapons. These were similar to
the device used at Nagasaki in 1945. Iraq was also working
on more
Effect
of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation
A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city
might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within
1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would
cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal.
Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would
still be 10% casualties. |
advanced concepts. By 1991 the programme was supported by a large
body of Iraqi nuclear expertise, programme documentation and databases
and manufacturing infrastructure. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) reported that Iraq had:
-
experimented with high explosives to
produce implosive shock waves;
-
invested
significant effort to understand the various options for neutron
initiators;
-
made significant progress in developing
capabilities for the production, casting and machining
of uranium metal.
SCUD missiles
The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed
by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology
of the German V-2 developed in World War II.
For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw
Pact tactical missile forces and it was also widely exported.
Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North
Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly
by the Soviet Union. |
- Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed ballistic
missile industry.
Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi modified
version
of the SCUD missile, the al-Hussein, with an extended range
of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior
to the Gulf War plus an
unknown number of indigenously produced engines and components.
Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as
the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking
to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing
new missiles. Recent intelligence indicates that they may
have succeeded at that time. In particular, Iraq had plans
for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq
also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite
launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the al-Abid.
Also during this period, Iraq was developing the Badr-2000,
a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based
on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation
with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 12001500km
range solid propellant follow-on systems.
The
use of chemical and biological weapons
- Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons
during the Iran-Iraq War. Many of the casualties are still
in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects
of numerous types of cancer and lung diseases. In 1988 Saddam
also used mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at
Halabja in northern Iraq (see box on p15). Estimates vary,
but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were
killed.
- Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin
during the war with Iran resulting in over 20,000 Iranian
casualties. A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops
used over 100 tonnes of sarin against Iranian troops on the
al-Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops
used sarin and other nerve agents on Iranian troops causing
extensive casualties.
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The Attack
on Halabja
On Friday 17th March 1988 the village of Halabja was bombarded
by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes. Saddam
Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people. A
Kurd described the effects of a chemical attack on another
village:
"My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from
their noses and their mouths. Their heads were tilted to
one side. They were groaning. I couldn't do much, just clean
up the blood and vomit from their mouths and try in every
way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration
on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also
rubbed creams on my wife and two brothers." |
| (From "Crimes Against Humanity" Iraqi National Congress.) |
Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead
where they had been playing outside their homes. In places,
streets were piled with corpses.
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- From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we
know that by 1991
Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical
and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs
and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted
to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical
and 25 biological warheads available for its ballistic missiles.
The use
of ballistic missiles
- Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the
Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93
SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted
at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region.
- At the end of the Gulf War the international community was
determined that Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons and ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method
chosen to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to
carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate
its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles
with a range of over 150km. The IAEA was charged with the
abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991
and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very
large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles
as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also
destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme
and removed key nuclear materials. This was achieved despite
a continuous and sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction,
deception and denial (see Part 2). Because of this UNSCOM
concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfil its mandate.
The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.
- Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in
January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when
the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for:
up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including
1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including
approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare
programme, were unique to the production of VX;
growth media procured for biological agent production
(enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax
spores Iraq admits to having manufactured);
over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical
and biological agents.
14. The departure of UNSCOM meant that the international
community was unable to establish the truth behind these large
discrepancies and greatly diminished its ability to monitor and
assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its programmes.
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