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Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - The Assessment of the British
Government
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
- Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological
weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring
countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop
a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against
Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq
had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam
agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.
- Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is
already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors.
This points clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991,
of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before
the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly
associated with the production of chemical and biological agents.
And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents,
and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles
to deliver them.
- An independent and well-researched overview of this public
evidence was provided by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) on
9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble
nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from
foreign sources.
- As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional
information is available to the Government from secret intelligence
sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence
cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller
picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam
Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass
destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional
power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of
last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own
population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).
- Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal
evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents,
from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions
and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress
with his illicit weapons programmes.
- As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:
-
continued to produce chemical and biological
agents;
-
military plans for the use of chemical
and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population.
Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order
to use them;
-
command and control arrangements
in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately
resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may
have delegated this authority to his son Qusai);
-
developed mobile laboratories for
military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production
of biological warfare agents;
-
pursued illegal programmes to procure
controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical
and biological weapons programmes;
-
tried covertly to acquire technology
and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear
weapons;
-
sought significant quantities of
uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power
programme that could require it;
-
recalled specialists to work on its
nuclear programme;
-
illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein
missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical
or biological warheads;
-
started deploying its al-Samoud liquid
propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors
to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond
the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
-
started producing the solid-propellant
Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least
200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United
Nations;
-
constructed a new engine test stand
for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign
Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as
well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel;
-
pursued illegal programmes to procure
materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
-
learnt lessons from previous UN weapons
inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment
and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.
-
These judgements reflect the views of the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements and
on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998 are set
out in Part 1 of this paper.
-
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of
international law. Under a series of UN Security Council Resolutions
Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under
the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out
the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the
history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq's history of deception,
intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.
-
But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on
the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of
the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime.
His record of internal repression and external aggression gives
rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly
outlines in Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his regime
and his history of regional aggression. Saddam's human rights
abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture, mass
arrests and summary executions.
-
The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance
its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside
UN control, Iraq generated illegal income of some $3 billion in
2001.
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